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Understanding Interference and Inhibition
Processes from a Motivational and Self-Regulated
Learning Perspective: Comments on Dempster
and Corkill
Paul R. Pintrich1
Interference and inhibition processes as discussed by Dempster and Corkill
(1999) are useful on two levels: first, metaphorically in terms of general
themes for educational psychology, and, second, in terms of psychological
mechanisms for understanding learning. At the same time, there are a number
of issues that must be addressed in future theory and research before interfer-
ence and inhibition processes can be accorded a primary explanatory role
in models of learning, including the operation and sequencing of interference
and inhibition processes in relation to other cognitive, motivational, and self-
regulation processes; the definition and construction of the relevant-irrelevant
information dimension; the role of interference and inhibition in the active
selection of goals, strategies, and behavior; the stability and trait-like nature
of interference and inhibition; the range of generality and applicability of
interference and inhibition in relation to all other aspects of learning and
behavior; and the utility and power of interference and inhibition as explana-
tory constructs.
Dempster and Corkill (1999) have certainly made an important contri-
bution to the educational psychological literature in their review of the pro-
cesses of interference and inhibition and the role these processes play in mem-
ory, cognition, intelligence, reasoning, and self-regulated learning. The
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authors have marshaled evidence from quite diverse areas of research to dem-
onstrate the importance of both interference and inhibition processes for
understanding cognition and behavior. The constructs of interference and
inhibition are useful on two levels: first, on the metaphorical level in terms
of general themes for educational psychology and second, on the theoretical
level in terms of defining basic psychological mechanisms and their physiolog-
ical underpinnings that must constrain all psychological constructs.
I have been asked to comment on their review given my research and
perspective on motivation and self-regulated learning. First, I comment on
interference and inhibition processes from this perspective and suggest
that consideration of these processes can help us understand self-regulated
learning both metaphorically and theoretically. At the same time, however,
I suggest that these processes are not the only important constructs to
consider in psychological models and that motivation and active self-regula-
tion are still key constructs. Finally, I raise some general questions about
interference and inhibition processes that need to be clarified in future
theory and research.
First, in terms of application to self-regulated learning, Dempster and
Corkill basically offer two general suggestions, one concerning the role of
negative affect and negative cognitions in self-regulated learning and one
involving a broader role of inhibition and interference in the selection of
goals, strategies, and behavior. In considering the role of negative affect
and cognitions, Dempster and Corkill rightly point out that there are a
number of models of anxiety and emotions that suggest how negative affect
can interfere with attention, cognition, and learning. In addition, many of
these models propose that the negative self-referent cognitions that can
accompany negative emotions like anxiety also can interfere with cognitive
processing. At the metaphorical level, Dempster and Corkill have aptly
characterized these models of anxiety in terms of their reliance on a general
theme of interference.
For example, some models assume individuals have a limited cognitive
capacity and that anxious and negative self-referent thoughts use up some
of that capacity, making less of it available for the task at hand and thereby
"interfering" with attention and cognitive processing (see Tobias, 1985).
Other models suggest that individuals use both cognitive and metacognitive
strategies (e.g., Benjamin et al., 1981) as well as motivational and volitional
strategies (e.g., Boekaerts, 1993) to cope with test anxiety and the associated
negative affect and cognitions. These models propose that individuals who
lack or do not use these self-regulatory strategies show the most debilitating
effects of test anxiety and that all individuals can use these self-regulatory
strategies to help them overcome or compensate for the problems of test
anxiety. In addition, there are models (e.g., Kanfer and Ackerman, 1996;
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Tobias, 1985) that attempt to synthesize both the cognitive capacity and
the self-regulatory strategy models of test anxiety.
Given these explanatory mechanisms, Dempster and Corkill are cor-
rect in noting that these models rely on the general idea that test anxiety
"interferes" with performance by increasing the demands on cognitive
and attentional resources and that various self-regulatory strategies can be
invoked to "inhibit" the negative affect and self-referent thoughts that are
generated by test anxiety. However, moving beyond this metaphorical level,
Dempster and Corkill also imply that there is an even more basic psychologi-
cal mechanism that underlies the problems associated with test anxiety.
They suggest that resistance to interference is a basic cognitive process that
complements the capacity and strategy mechanisms proposed by other
models. Resistance to interference in their model involves the ability to
ignore or resist or inhibit irrelevant or off-task information and behaviors
while doing a task (Dempster and Corkill, 1999). They suggest that this
basic process of resistance to interference depends on the operation of the
frontal lobes and operates in a more associative manner and can't be
explained in term of other cognitive processes (i.e., lack of resources or
cognitive and volitional control strategies).
In this model, as I understand it, as an individual begins a task, a
variety of relevant and irrelevant information to the task is activated
and the resistance to interference process helps the individual focus on
the relevant information and behaviors and ignore the irrelevant informa-
tion and inhibit inappropriate behaviors. In addition, it seems to me
that this process is fairly "automatic" and not necessarily under the
conscious control of the individual. Moreover, individuals who have
trouble attending to the relevant information are somehow deficit in
their ability to resist or inhibit the irrelevant information. In the special
case of negative affect and anxiety, the irrelevant information includes
negative thoughts and doubts about one's ability to do the task as well
as negative affect about the task. For individuals who do not have the
ability to resist these negative thoughts and affect, there is then interfer-
ence with performance of the task, regardless of capacity constraints or
strategy use. In this sense, test anxious individuals are redefined in terms
of their lack of ability to resist interference, not in term of their lack
of strategies or in terms of limitations in working memory capacity. Of
course, the resistance to interference model would allow that test-anxious
individuals, or perhaps a better term in this model, "deficient interference
resisters," could benefit from the use of various cognitive, motivational,
and volitional control strategies to help them cope with their interference
problems. However, in this model the initial source of the test anxiety
problem is the lack of capability to resist interference, not the lack of
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strategies, although strategies could certainly be invoked to compensate
for the problem.
This basic psychological mechanism of resistance to interference can
certainly be used to explain some of the difficulties of test anxious individu-
als, but it is not clear that it can be used to explain all the differences. First,
there is evidence that there are at least two types of test-anxious individuals
and that they differ in terms of their problems at the encoding and retrieval
stages (e.g., Naveh-Benjamin et al., 1987). The group that has difficulties
at the retrieval stage, during the actual testing situation when they retrieve
irrelevant information including negative self-referent thoughts, do seem
to fit the resistance to interference explanation. On the other hand, Naveh-
Benjamin et al. (1987) found that the other group of students had problems
at the encoding stage, when learning the material in a nonevaluative situa-
tion. These students had difficulties organizing the material and did not use
very effective cognitive strategies. This group's lack of effective strategies
resulted in poor encoding of the material and led to retrieval problems
during testing, suggesting an important role of strategies early on in the
process of learning.
Of course, from an interference perspective, one could argue that this
group, at the encoding stage, also was unable to resist irrelevant information
and that irrelevant information was then encoded early in the learning
process and then retrieved at testing, resulting in poor performance. This
raises questions about the operation, sequencing, and interaction of these
different psychological mechanisms such as resistance to interference, ca-
pacity, and strategies that need to be addressed in empirical research.
Nevertheless, it still seems that strategies can play an important role in
explaining the detrimental effects of test anxiety. Accordingly, although
resistance to interference may be useful as a metaphor for understanding
anxiety, there is still a need for theoretical models and empirical research
that examine at the psychological level how learner's resistance to interfer-
ence and their use of various cognitive, metacognitive, and volitional strate-
gies interact with limited capacity resources in order to explain the role of
anxiety in learning.
Moving beyond the specific case of negative affect and anxiety, the
resistance to interference model raises several general issues that have
implications for models of motivation and self-regulated learning. First, as
with anxiety, the resistance to interference model seems to assume that all
problems of self-regulation are a function of the a priori basic cognitive
primitive of the ability to resist interference. That is, if an individual is
able to resist interference from irrelevant information and inhibit various
prepotent responses, then there is no need for self-regulation or self-regula-
tory strategies. Again, at the metaphorical level, this seems reasonable.
108 Pintrich
Individuals clearly do not need to self-regulate all the time and there are
many occasions when the system functions automatically without active,
conscious control and self-regulation. In addition, there are certainly occa-
sions when the system "breaks down" (because of physiological damage
to the brain or psychologically when irrelevant information is accessed or
"disturbing" cognitions and emotions are activated) which require various
self-regulatory processes to be used for more adaptive functioning. How-
ever, I do not think it is clear that self-regulatory strategies are used only
when the system "breaks down" or used only after the resistance to interfer-
ence mechanism has operated. I think they can be used in a more proactive
manner, rather than just as reactive strategies called into play when resis-
tance to interference is low.
This brings up the issue of the sequencing and operation of these
various mechanisms again and raises questions at the psychological level
in terms of the actual specification of explanatory mechanisms. The mecha-
nism of resistance to interference does provide a good way to explain how
information and knowledge is accessed relatively automatically and helps
to define the task or situation for the individual. This is a welcome addition
to models of self-regulated learning, which have tended to ignore issues of
how prior knowledge interacts with self-regulatory processes. In addition,
as Dempster and Corkill suggest, it could be one reason individuals access
irrelevant goals and strategies in different situations rather than more adap-
tive goals and strategies. In this way, it may be similar to the activation of
self-schemas which include various motivational and cognitive components
(Garcia and Pintrich, 1994).
At the same time, however, the construct of resistance to interference
does not adequately address how irrelevant information is defined. It seems
to be defined in terms of task characteristics, although it is not really
made clear by Dempster and Corkill (1999). From a motivational and self-
regulatory perspective, it may be that the relevant-irrelevant dimension is
defined in terms of personal goals and motivation. For example, if a student
is operating under a performance goal focused on relative ability and besting
others, then information regarding how well others are doing is relevant.
On the other hand, for a student focused on a goal of mastery and learning,
then how well others are doing is irrelevant information vis-a-vis this goal
(Ames, 1992; Wolters et al., 1996). The same argument could also be made
for various other motivational constructs such as efficacy, interest, and task
value. That is, students who vary in their self-efficacy may seek out different
kinds of information in the task, with low-efficacy individuals focusing on
task difficulty cues and high-efficacy individuals focusing on the challenge
of the task. The same process could operate with students who vary in their
interest and value for the task.
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These simple examples of how motivational goals or other aspects
of personal motivation can help to define what is relevant or irrelevant
information for an individual reflect a more constructivist perspective on
self-regulated learning than is represented in the resistance to interference
model. The inclusion of motivational constructs as a parameter that influ-
ences the processing of information in terms of relevance suggests that
there is more of a role for the individual's active construction of the task and
situation. Ever since the "New Look" in perception and social psychological
research in the 1950s, there has been a recognition that we need to include
the person along with his or her motives, goals, and expectations as part of
our understanding of even such basic processes such as perception (Hilgard,
1987). This somehow seems lacking in the interference models, which, at
least metaphorically, seem to imply less constructivist and more passive
and reactive individuals who are dependent on the ability to resist interfer-
ence and inhibit irrelevant information and inappropriate behaviors, at
least as they initially confront a task.
Moving beyond the metaphorical level, the consideration of the role
of motivational constructs suggests that the operation of the interference
or inhibition mechanisms may be different or depend on the individuals'
goals and other motivational beliefs. If this is so, then the assumption that
resistance to interference is the first mechanism to operate as an individual
engages in a task may have to be reconsidered. A motivational analysis
suggests that goals and motivational beliefs may be operating simultane-
ously and that the relations are reciprocal, rather than motivation and
self-regulation coming into play after interference or inhibition processes.
Again, there is a need for much more empirical work with students on
academic tasks to investigate how these different processes might operate
together to influence academic learning.
Besides these issues regarding sequencing and operation, Dempster
and Corkill suggest that interference and inhibition processes can help us
understand how an individual selects strategies and behavior. I agree with
them that the issue of selection is one of the most important issues for any
psychological theory, but I am not sure that interference and inhibition
processes are the main mechanisms for selection. In terms of research on
motivation in general, selection of behavior has typically been the driving
question that motivational theories are designed to explain. In this sense,
there are a number of motivational mechanisms, such as goals, needs,
interests, values, and so forth, that have been used to help us explain why
someone chooses to engage in specific activities in contrast to other activities
(Pintrich and Schunk, 1996). More specifically, research on academic moti-
vation has shown that motivational goals can have an important influence
on the selection and use of various cognitive and self-regulatory strategies.
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Individuals who are operating with a mastery goal tend to select different
strategies than those operating with a performance goal (Dweck and Leg-
gett, 1988; Pintrich and Schunk, 1996).
In addition, there are other cognitive models that stress the selection
of strategies, but rely instead on a general evolutionary metaphor that
includes variation in strategies, adaptive selection among these various
strategies, and continuous change coupled with increasing adaptiveness
over time in the use of strategies (e.g., Siegler, 1996). This evolutionary
metaphor also might provide some suggestions on how to define the
relevant-irrelevant dimension in terms of general adaptiveness of strategy
use and behavior over time. Moreover, Siegler's (1996) ACSM model
relies on more standard psychological mechanisms such as strategy use,
knowledge base, and speed and accuracy information that modify the
database of knowledge, strategies, and their interaction, although it does
include an important role for associative learning, not unlike interference
models. Finally, again from a more metaphorical perspective, selection
of strategies and behavior implies a more "active" choice by the individual,
rather than a more passive mode of automatic resisting or inhibiting
prepotent responses.
A final issue from a motivational and self-regulatory perspective con-
cerns the conceptualization of resistance to interference as an important de-
velopmental and individual difference variable. Although there are certainly
developmental aspects of resistance to interference that can be tied to the
development of the frontal lobes, I am not sure about the status of resistance
to interference as a stable personal trait or individual difference. At one level,
it seems that resistance to interference is assumed to be a stable individual
difference variable given its strong links to an individual's brain functioning,
especially in the case of individuals with physiological damage to the brain.
At the same time, it seems that there can be situational differences in how
individuals react to different situations, even in the special case of high-test
anxious students, who do not show deficits in performance in nonevaluative
situations. It is not clear how this situational variability and contextual sensi-
tivity is handled in a resistance to interference model, especially if this ability
to resist interference is a general stable trait tied closely to specific structures
in an individual's brain. From a motivational and self-regulated learning per-
spective, some models suggest that depending on the context and the personal
goals activated in the context, individuals' use of various self-regulatory strat-
egies will vary. In this case, these models seem to be able to handle more
easily the situational differences in the specific case of a high-test anxious
person's performance as well as other more general examples of situational
differences in individuals' behavior.
This issue of trait versus situational specificity of behavior is a long-
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standing conundrum in psychology in general and educational psychology,
in particular, and there is no single solution or model that can incorporate
both intraindividual consistency and situational specificity (Pintrich, 1994;
Snow et al., 1996). It may be that individual researchers have to make
choices about what level of specificity they find most useful given their
research questions and area of study. For example, Snow et al. (1996)
suggest that there is a hierarchy of different levels of referent generality
that ranges from personality types and traits at the top, which are very
general and are assumed to cut across most situations, to very specific
responses and states that are very context dependent. In the middle of
their hierarchy are various strategies and tactics as well as motivational
orientations which can show some intraindividual consistency as well as
situational specificity. These different levels of constructs can then be linked
to a number of different achievement or learning outcomes, which also
could be at different levels of specificity (Snow et al., 1996).
It seems to me that resistance to interference may be closer to the top
of this hierarchy in terms of being a more stable individual difference
somewhat similar to temperament or one of the five main traits or factors
that consistently emerge in factor analytic personality research such as
impulsivity versus control and constraint. In fact, the relations of tempera-
ment and the personality trait of impulsivity to affect, other aptitudes, and
various learning outcomes (see Snow et al., 1996) do seem to parallel some
of the findings discussed by Dempster and Corkill. This may be another
connection that Dempster and Corkill want to pursue in terms of how their
more "cognitive" construct of resistance to interference is linked to more
"personality" constructs such as the trait of impulsivity. In turn, these
constructs such as general traits may be best linked to outcomes at a
fairly high level of generality such as overall achievement, intelligence,
and performance on decontextualized laboratory tasks. In contrast, more
context-specific constructs such as prior knowledge, self-regulatory strate-
gies, and motivational goals may be better linked to more contextualized
and specific academic performance.
Certainly, in the personality literature the same argument has been
made that general traits are relevant for the selection of behavior and the
prediction of general life outcomes but that more contextualized constructs
such as knowledge, strategies, and goals are also important to consider in
terms of predicting individuals' behavior and life outcomes (Cantor and
Kihlstrom, 1987). In fact, in this personality literature, the personality traits
are often seen as one general "personal" factor that influences individuals'
more contextualized goals, knowledge, and strategies, but it is these goals,
knowledge, and strategies that mediate any relation between general traits
and overall behavior and life outcomes. In other words, the contextualized
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goals, knowledge, and strategies are the important mediating and linking
variables, not the general traits.
In the same manner, there is no denying the fact that general personal-
ity traits and styles can be linked to academic learning and performance
(Snow et al., 1996). However, paralleling the personality research, it may
be that most of the effects of general traits on academic outcomes are
mediated by more local and contextualized constructs such as knowledge,
motivation, self-regulatory strategies, and affect. Of course, this is an empiri-
cal question and I look forward to more research on the mediating effects
versus direct effects of resistance to interference and other motivational
and self-regulatory variables on academic outcomes. At the same time,
from a strictly pedagogical perspective, if traits are stable and relatively
unchangeable, then it may not be very worthwhile to make them the focus
of educational interventions. In contrast, knowledge, motivation, self-regu-
latory strategies, and affect are usually considered changeable and seem
to be more amenable to instructional interventions. I think that this general
focus on more malleable psychological constructs offers more hope to
teachers and can motivate them to persist in the face of their daunting task
to educate all students.
A consideration of the stability of our constructs raises a very
general issue regarding the utility of the resistance to interference
construct that goes beyond a consideration of motivation and self-
regulated learning. As with general trait models of personality such as
the factor analytic work on the five main personality traits, a reader is
often left with the question, "So, is there anything that is not explained
by this model?" In the personality case, the five general factors or traits
are supposed to explain much of the variance in an individual's behavior
across situations and over time. In the same manner, I had this exact
thought after reading Dempster and Corkill's article in terms of their
use of the general constructs of interference and inhibition to explain
a great diversity of behavior including memory, intelligence, logical and
mathematical reasoning, reading comprehension, and strategy use. In
some ways, the model may overgeneralize the constructs of interference
and inhibition. Again, at a metaphorical level in terms of general themes,
I think that the constructs may be useful for educational psychologists
as they think about the various processes involved in academic learning.
However, I think that learning is very complex and that one general
construct, whether it be intelligence, motivation, or interference, is not
enough to do justice to the complexity of the phenomenon. Psychologists
need more specific psychological constructs, which can certainly include
resistance to interference, but can also include other constructs that have
cognitive, motivational, self-regulatory, and affective components.
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Beyond this issue of the generalizability of the constructs, researchers
need to consider whether interference and inhibition are truly explanatory
constructs or just descriptive constructs or general themes. As Siegler
(1996) notes, there are many constructs that have been proposed as
mechanisms of change such as equilibration, accommodation, assimilation,
conceptual restructuring, zone of proximal development, and scaffolding,
but it is not clear if these really "explain" change and development or
just describe various processes. In the same manner, it is not clear if
interference and inhibition really explain selection of behaviors or just
describe certain cognitive activities and processes. Of course, description
is very important, and interference and inhibition are certainly in good
company if included with equilibration, accommodation, and so forth.
Moreover, the theoretical and empirical difficulties in using all these
constructs to explain learning and development, not just interference
and inhibition, signify how difficult it is to develop explanatory mecha-
nisms from any theoretical perspective in psychology. It may be that
psychological models always will be limited in their explanatory power
and that this realization motivates some of the turn to more physiological
models of brain functioning. In any event, it seems that more specificity
in the models of the various mechanisms is needed and that one general
mechanism such as equilibration or interference or inhibition will not
be sufficient for explaining all behaviors. These general mechanisms may
be helpful, maybe even necessary, but not sufficient, and other mechanisms
that include constructs such as capacity, self-regulatory strategies, motiva-
tion, and affect are also necessary.
In summary, the constructs of interference and inhibition are certainly
useful as general metaphors or themes to think about as educational psy-
chologists attempt to understand learning in educational settings. Moreover,
it seems important to consider the role of more specific psychological
mechanisms such as resistance to interference as part of a general nomologi-
cal network for examining the problems of motivation, cognition, and self-
regulated learning. At the same time, I am not sure that mechanisms such
as resistance to interference should be given primary or central explanatory
status in models of self-regulation until there is much more empirical re-
search on their relations with other constructs such as motivation, strategy
use, and affect. This will require a concerted research effort with primary
attention to issues of construct validity in the measurement of all these
different mechanisms and structures because many of their features and
hypothesized functions are very similar. To this end, however, Dempster
and Corkill have provided a number of good sites to begin this research,
and in this sense, like all productive models, their work is generative for
the field of educational psychology.
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